



Вопросы к США и Украине на консультативном совещании государств-участников Конвенции о запрещении биологического и токсинного оружия

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Вопросы к США и Украине, касающиеся соблюдения обязательств по Статьям I и IV КБТО

BWC/CONS/2022/WP.26

Formal Consultative Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

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2022 Meeting
Geneva, 26 August and 5-9 September 2022
Item 6 of the agenda

Respective outstanding questions by the Russian Federation to the United States and to Ukraine concerning the fulfilment of their respective obligations under the Convention in the context of the operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine

Questions of the Russian Federation to the United States and Ukraine regarding the compliance with their obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) in the context of the activities of biological laboratories in the territory of Ukraine

Submitted by the Russian Federation

I. Questions to Ukraine regarding compliance with obligations under Part 1 of Article I of the BTWC

1. What activities with pathogenic biomaterials were carried out at the I.Mechnikov Anti-Plague Institute in Odessa in the period from 2017 to 2018, if, according to the report of the commission of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, there were over two thousand storage units of pathogenic biomaterials at that time, while in 2018 only one research work was officially conducted involving the tularemia strains in the collection of the Institute, and no report on the use of the collection for 2017 was submitted?
2. Why, as of December 28, 2018, there was no documented information at the I.Mechnikov Anti-Plague Institute in Odessa regarding the actual status of strains, and there was not an evidence base regarding the need to maintain a large number of pathogen test tubes with the same strains of different passages presented to the committee?
3. What is the reason for the choice of pathogens studied in Ukraine as part of the Threat Reduction Program? Why in a number of cases the nomenclature of studied pathogens is not related to relevant public health problems and can hardly be explained by preventive or protective purposes (for example the TAP-6 project to study the causative agent of glanders, cases of which have never been recorded by veterinary and sanitary and epidemiological services of Ukraine)? Why, under the conditions of the gravest state of sanitary and epidemiological well-being system, threatened by the spread of infections defeated in most countries of WHO European region and an unsatisfactory level of



«...3. Чем обусловлен выбор патогенных микроорганизмов, изучаемых на территории Украины в рамках Программы снижения угрозы? Почему в ряде случаев номенклатура изучаемых патогенов не связана с актуальными для здравоохранения проблемами и вряд ли может быть объяснена профилактическими или защитными целями (например проект TAP-6 по изучению возбудителя сапа, случаи которого никогда не фиксировались ветеринарной и санитарно-эпидемической службами Украины)?...»

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population immunization, in Ukraine the attention was not paid to actual health problems, but to anthrax, highly pathogenic influenza and other especially dangerous pathogens?

4. How should the accumulation of especially dangerous infection strains and their transfer to other countries help to improve the infectious disease situation?

5. Why is it necessary to store 422 containers with cholera bacteria at the I.Mechnikov Antiplague Institute in Odessa, if the genetic diversity of cholera-causing vibrios is limited to only two serogroups?

6. Why was emphasis placed on the study of naturally occurring and especially dangerous infections, which, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention lists, are considered to be potential pathogens for biological weapons?

7. Why is the study of pathogens of especially dangerous infections, including those that overcome the protective effect of vaccines and possessing the ability to control them, instead of improving the system of epidemiological surveillance, developing anti-epidemic action plans, conducting public health education, establishing the supply of vaccines and expanding immunization, the collection of information on the infection rate, biological samples of humans and their export, the export of national collections containing pathogenic microorganisms, considered to be a priority?

II. Questions to Ukraine regarding compliance with obligations under Part 2 of Article I of the BTWC

8. What kind of life- and health-threatening research is referred to in the UP-8 project (Circulation of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus and hantaviruses in Ukraine and the potential need for differential diagnosis of persons with suspected leptospirosis)?

9. What was the reason for the involvement of specialized U.S. military professionals in the research within the framework of the UP-2 project (Mapping of Especially Dangerous Infectious Diseases in Ukraine)? What tasks were solved by them in the course of the project? Considering that the epidemiological situation with anthrax in Ukraine remains favorable, why was the conducted research necessary and what are its true objectives?

10. What tasks were solved by the specialists of research organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the USA (researches were carried out by the specialists of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, the Naval Medical Research Institute) within the framework of fulfilled projects UP-1 (Implementation of geoinformation systems, remote detection and laboratory diagnostics while monitoring tularemia and anthrax in sanitary-epidemiological and veterinary practice in Ukraine) and UP-2? What justifies the necessity of their involvement as participants in research aimed at solving, as declared, "purely peaceful" tasks?

11. Why was the interest of the Ukrainian company "Motor Sich" in the vehicle "Bayraktar Akinci" (request of December 15,

«...4. Каким образом накопление штаммов особо опасных инфекций и их направление в другие страны должно содействовать улучшению состояния с инфекционной заболеваемостью?

6. Почему основной акцент делался на изучении природно-очаговых и особо опасных инфекций, которые согласно спискам Центров по контролю и профилактике заболеваний США рассматриваются как потенциальные патогены для биологического оружия?

9. Чем вызвана необходимость привлечения профильных военных специалистов США к исследованиям в рамках проекта UP-2 (Картографирование особо опасных инфекционных заболеваний на Украине)? Какие задачи решались ими в ходе выполнения проекта? Учитывая, что эпидемиологическая ситуация с сибирской язвой на Украине остается благополучной, в чем необходимость проводимых исследований и каковы их истинные цели?...

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14. Why, despite the revealed gross violations of biological safety requirements and prerequisites for theft of pathogenic materials, were the activities of Ukrainian biolaboratories continued in the normal mode?

IV. Questions for the United States regarding the compliance with its obligations under Article IV of the BTWC

15. Is it an established practice for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Agency to grant, after peer review, patents for inventions directly related to the delivery and use of biological and toxin weapons?

16. How does the granting of patents on inventions, the technical description of which implies their use as a means of delivery of biological and toxin weapons, relate to the U.S. obligations under Article IV of the BTWC?

17. Does the United States consider the inventions featured in these patents to be tools that could be used to deliver biological and toxin weapons?

18. What explains the necessity of the centralization of collections and transfer to the U.S. of the strains of dangerous pathogens isolated in the territory of Ukraine, as stipulated by Article IV of the 2005 Agreement "On cooperation in the field of prevention of the spread of pathogens, technologies and knowledge that may be used in the development of biological weapons" (Agreement)?

19. What is the reason for giving the results of works, obtained within the framework of the implementation of the Threat Reduction Program in Ukraine, a limited and closed nature? How does this requirement under the Agreement contribute to transparency and confidence-building within the BTWC?

20. How was the U.S. assistance, as implemented, intended to ensure a sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population of Ukraine? What are the objectives and goals of the U.S. assistance in the area of ensuring a sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population of Ukraine? What are the key indicators of its effectiveness?


21. What public health indicators have improved over the past 10-15 years due to the U.S. assistance in Ukraine? Has the sanitary and epidemiological situation in Ukraine improved as a result of the interaction with the United States: has the incidence of infectious diseases decreased, has the immunization coverage increased, has testing for infections become more accessible, are there more specialists (epidemiologists, microbiologists, sanitary doctors), have there been new developments of tests and vaccines, has the recording of infectious diseases improved?

«...19. Чем обусловлено придание результатам работ, полученных в рамках реализации на Украине Программы уменьшения угрозы, ограниченного и закрытого характера? Как данное требование, регламентируемое Соглашением, способствует обеспечению транспарентности и укреплению доверия в рамках КБТО?...



**В
соответствии с
заявлением
украинской
делегации**

**«...80 %
замечаний,
изложенных в
отчете, было
устранено...»**

[illegible]

«...общее количество штаммов микроорганизмов составляет 654: бактерии – «B. Anthracis» (32 штамма), «Brucella abortus» (5 штаммов), «Brucella melitensis» (4 штамма), «Brucella suis» (2 штамма), «Francisella tularensis» (189 штаммов), «Vibrio cholerae O1» (422 штамма) и 9 вирусов клещевого энцефалита...»





«...установлен факт неработающей системы контроля доступа к коллекциям патогенов... Документация, которая подтверждает оценку эффективности и надлежащее регулирование системы приточно-вытяжной вентиляции в помещении вирусологической лаборатории, не предоставлена...

«...е апреле 2017 г. произошла авария в лаборатории при работе с музейным штаммом вируса клещевого энцефалита, которая привела к инфицированию сотрудника, что указывает на недостаточный уровень обеспечения требований биологической безопасности при работе с биологическим материалом в лабораториях института...»

Сводный отчет по Программе снижения биологической угрозы на Украине (27.06.2019 г.)

Итоги реализации программ DTRA на Украине

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
<p>BWC <small>BIOWEAPONS CONVENTION</small></p> <p>Formal Consultative Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction</p> <hr/> <p>2023 Meeting Geneva, 16-19 April and 3-5 September 2023 74th 12th Session Biopreventive operations by the Russian Federation in the United States and by Ukraine concerning the fulfilment of their respective obligations under the Convention in the context of the operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine</p> <p>Ukraine Presentation, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Article V Consultative Meeting</p> <p><i>Submitted by Ukraine</i></p>	<p>Ukraine Presentation</p>  <p>Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Article V Consultative Meeting</p>	<p>Ukraine's compliance with obligations under the BTWC and engagement in BTRP activities</p>
 <p>Modernization of key public health laboratories</p>	 <p>Modernization of key public health laboratories</p>	 <p>Modernization of key public health laboratories</p>




Ответы США и Украины на обвинения в вывозе штаммов, биоматериалов украинских граждан, уничтожении коллекций патогенов

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Схема движения биологических материалов из Украины в другие страны



Ветеринарное разрешение на импорт и транспортировку подконтрольных материалов, организмов и переносчиков




«...Контрольные образцы для тестирования на зоонозные заболевания: кровь/плазма/сыворотка, ткани, спинномозговая жидкость, моча, кал от птиц, лошадей, мышей, собак, кошек, летучих мышей, человека...»

В соответствии с заявлением американской делегации передача штаммов в США «...была нечастой...»




Указания минздрава Украины о проведении экстренного уничтожения патогенных биологических агентов



«...в связи с введением с 24 февраля 2022 года военного положения в Украине в соответствии с Указом Президента Украины от 24.02.2022 № 64/2022, просит обеспечить экстренное уничтожение биологических патогенных агентов, которые используются для обеспечения проведения лабораторных исследований, в установленном порядке, который прилагается.

Технический брифинг США для консультативного совещания по статье V КБТО



СТАТЬЯ I КОНВЕНЦИИ

Ст. 1: Каждое государство-участник Конвенции обязуется никогда, ни при каких обстоятельствах не разрабатывать, не производить, не накапливать, не приобретать каким-либо иным образом и не сохранять:

- 1) микробиологические или другие биологические агенты или токсины, каково бы ни было их происхождение или метод производства, таких видов и в таких количествах, которые не предназначены для профилактических, защитных или других мирных целей;
- 2) оружие, оборудование или средства доставки, предназначенные для использования таких агентов или токсинов во враждебных целях или в вооруженных конфликтах.

Запрос украинского предприятия «Мотор Сич» в адрес турецкого производителя беспилотных летательных аппаратов «Байрактар Акинджи»



Date: 2021/12/15
Document №: 211215-UKR-MTC-GNR/48

Subject : Baykar Reply to The State Export Control Service of Ukraine Requests About MS-500V-02ST
References :

To: Motor-Sich JSC, 15, Motorostroiteley Avenue Zaporozhye, 69068, Ukraine
Vyacheslav Shuklin
Senior Contract Engineer

Dear Mr. Shuklin

Baykar would like to express its sincere respect to your company for continuous support.

You may see Baykar reply for The State Export Control Service of Ukraine requests as follows in bold letters:

Государственная служба экономического контроля Украины просит предоставить следующую информацию про базовый БПЛА:	The State Export Control Service of Ukraine requests you to provide the following information on the basic UAV:
1. Название БПЛА?	1. UAV name.
- БПЛА Bayraktar Akinci	- Bayraktar Akinci UAV
2. Сфера применения БПЛА?	2. UAV scope.
- Двухмоторный самолет с неподвижным крылом	- Twin engine fixed wing aircraft
3. Осуществляет контролируемый полет за пределами прямого "естественного видения оператора"?	3. Does the UAV operational mode foresee the capability to be controlled out of the "direct vision range" of the operator?
- Да	- Yes
4. Максимальная продолжительность полета БПЛА?	4. Maximum duration of a UAV flight
- 24 часа	- 24 hour
5. Предназначен взлетать и осуществлять стабильный управляемый полет при порывах ветра 46,3 км/ч (25 узлов) или больше?	5. Is the UAV designed to take off and perform stable controlled flight in wind gusts of 46.3 km/h (25 knots) or more?
- Нет	- No
6. Способен ли достигать дальность полета 300 км?	6. Is the UAV capable of flying to distances of 300 km?

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Baykar Makina San. Tic. A.Ş.
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Tel: +90 212 867 0900 | Fax: +90 212 867 0949
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Заявление Самюэля У.Макдональда по статье V КБТО

Formal Consultative Meeting of the St to the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

2022 Meeting
Geneva, 24 August and 5-9 September 2022
Item 6 of the agenda
Respective understanding questions by the Russian Fed to the United States and to Ukraine concerning the of their respective obligations under the Convention of the operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine

Statement to the Article V Under the Biological and Convention By Samuel W Advisor to the U.S. Delegation

Submitted by the United States of America

Mr. Chairman,
In addition to the file allegations about biological weapons concerns that a patent law for a "biological weapons" patent system, in exchange several years ago, in 2019, the United States immediately carrying any other biotechnology, genetic, or other scientific, using the question of whether such a device would the U.S. government approval of this patent must mean you that it does not constitute a violation.
First, we should point out that, as far as we are aware, by a private entity and we on the behalf of the government, in Russia in 2019 a patent, under U.S. law, patents do not confer a right to make, they simply give a patent owner certain exclusive rights, such as making, or selling, or importing, or distributing, or otherwise using the invention. This aligns with international practice, which is set out in the WIPO Patent Treaty. Rights, see e.g., Article 28, TRIPS Agreement. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office conforms to such "international" standards. As far as Russia's June 11 State Ministry, the United States is not aware of the production, testing, or in person granted for private, make or use the patent invention into the matter, it is clear that the first ever made or produced by the government itself (in contrast to, from 50-50) acknowledges and use of such an invention as a support.

CB-22-134703

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«...разработка и производство биологического оружия запрещены в США, и любое нарушение карается наказанием, начиная от штрафов и заканчивая тюремным заключением...»
«...решение о выдаче патента не нарушает обязательств США по КБТО и не означает, что правительство США потворствует заявлениям изобретателей...»

Требования законодательства США к патентным документам

uspto



What Can Be Patented

The patent law specifies the general field of subject matter that can be patented and the conditions under which a patent may be obtained.

In the language of the statute, any person who "invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent," subject to the conditions and requirements of the law. The word "process" is defined by law as a process, act, or method, and primarily includes industrial or technical processes. The term "machine" used in the statute needs no explanation. The term "manufacture" refers to articles that are made, and includes all manufactured articles. The term "composition of matter" relates to chemical compositions and may include mixtures of ingredients as well as new chemical compounds. These classes of subject matter taken together include practically everything that is made by man and the processes for making the products.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 excludes the patenting of inventions useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon. See 42 U.S.C. 2181(a).

The patent law specifies that the subject matter must be "useful." The term "useful" in this connection refers to the condition that the subject matter has a useful purpose and also includes operativeness, that is, a machine which will not operate to perform the intended purpose would not be called useful, and therefore would not be granted a patent.

A patent cannot be obtained upon a mere idea or suggestion. The patent is granted upon the new machine, manufacture, etc., as has been said, and not upon the idea or suggestion of the new machine. A complete description of the actual machine or other subject matter for which a patent is sought is required.

«...Патент не может быть получен на идею...
Необходимо полное описание фактически существующего устройства...»

Попытки Украины прекратить сотрудничество с Пентагоном в рамках Программы по снижению биологической угрозы

Обращение посла США Дж.Тэффта к министру агрополитики Украины

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AT
THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
February 1, 2013

I regret that I am unable to make this material AVAILABLE, as required by
E.O. 13526, and to be turned to you.

I plan to be in the Netherlands on February 19, 2013, and may be able to meet the one
individual designated by you. I cannot, however, make any promises as to whether I will
discuss, identify, or issue a waiver with respect to the incident. The U.S. Government
maintained significant resources in the past and has identified with it
a number of categories. You are not responsible for any waiver to you.

Sincerely,

John A. Smith
Deputy Principal Assistant Secretary

Recently, we notified the Ministry of Health and the State Secretary
and Probationary Service of the U.S. Government project management team.
The project is currently completed and has been in two meetings with
the Ministry of Health and the State Secretary. The project is currently
in the final stages of the project. The project is currently in the final
stages of the project. The project is currently in the final stages of the
project. The project is currently in the final stages of the project.

[illegible]

За виконавцями цієї комісії, відомо, вище відбиття змержаності сторони негативна позначаються на процесі реалізації Угоди та є неприйнятними для України у контексті власного бачення концепції побудови ефективної системи епідеміологічного та біологічного нагляду, прийнятої 01.04.2013р. постановою Кабінету Міністрів України № 620 "Про затвердження Державної цільової програми з біобезпеки на 2015-2020 р.р."

«...госветслужба препятствует допуску представителей США на свои объекты...»

Справка компании Black & Veatch о ходе выполнения Программы по снижению биологической угрозы на Украине по состоянию на 2014 г.

Письмо представителя управления по снижению угрозы Минобороны США на Украине

Заявление Кингстона Рейфа на консультативном совещании по статье V КБТО

A collage of various international treaties and agreements related to biological weapons. The documents are arranged in a grid-like fashion, with some overlapping. The visible titles include:

- Chemical Weapons Convention** (top left)
- Biological Weapons Convention** (top center)
- Arms Control and Disarmament Treaty** (top right)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, Use and Transfer of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction** (middle left)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, Use and Transfer of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction** (middle center)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, Use and Transfer of Nuclear Weapons and on Their Destruction** (middle right)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, Use and Transfer of Biological Weapons and on Their Destruction** (bottom left)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, Use and Transfer of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction** (bottom center)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, Use and Transfer of Nuclear Weapons and on Their Destruction** (bottom right)

The documents are in various stages of completion, with some showing full text and others showing only the title or a portion of the text. The text is in English and is presented in a formal, legalistic style.

«...На территории Украины после распада Советского Союза учреждения здравоохранения и ветеринарии нуждались в помощи для соблюдения стандартов безопасности и биозащитности.

...Благодаря нашей партнерской программе CTR были построены, отремонтированы и модернизированы помещения для украинских специалистов в области здравоохранения и ветеринарии, чтобы они могли работать в лабораториях, соответствующих международным стандартам».



Итоги консультативного совещания государств-участников Конвенции о запрещении биологического и токсинного оружия

7

Заявление специального представителя США Кеннета Д. Уорда



Кеннет Д. Уорд
(Kenneth D. Ward)


Специальный представитель США

1995-2001 годы – заместитель главы делегации США на многосторонних переговорах по подготовке КБТО

2004-2007 годы – заместитель главы операции по отказу Ливии от оружия массового поражения

2010-2015 годы – директор отдела по проблемам химического и биологического оружия (AVC/BVC) при Госдепартаменте США

2015-2019 годы – постоянный представитель США при ОЗХО



«...в ходе данного совещания Украина и США совместно представят факты о сотрудничестве и опровергнут обвинения, выдвинутые Российской Федерацией...»




2017 год



2018 год



Итоговый отчет консультативного совещания государств-участников Конвенции



По итогам официального консультативного совещания не было достигнуто консенсуса

Совместное заявление по итогам консультативного совещания государств-участников Конвенции

Formal Consultative Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

26 August to 31 September 2022

Geneva, 30 August and 31 September 2022

Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Joint Statement on the Results of the Consultative Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) under BTWC Article V

Submitted by: Belarus, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela, Zimbabwe

Констатируем, что вопросы к военной биологической деятельности США в контексте функционирования биологаторий на украинской территории по-прежнему остаются. На них не были получены исчерпывающие ответы, которые были бы способны окончательно развеять сомнения в связи с указанной активностью и таким образом урегулировать ситуацию, ставшую причиной созыва российской стороной консультативного совещания по статье V КБТО. Выражаем сожаление по этому поводу.

1. We note that the Russian Federation has not provided a satisfactory answer to the questions raised in the joint statement of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) under Article V of the Convention, dated 29 August 2022, regarding the activities of the Russian Federation in the context of the operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine.

2. We note that the Russian Federation has not provided a satisfactory answer to the questions raised in the joint statement of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) under Article V of the Convention, dated 29 August 2022, regarding the activities of the Russian Federation in the context of the operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine.

3. We note that the Russian Federation has not provided a satisfactory answer to the questions raised in the joint statement of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) under Article V of the Convention, dated 29 August 2022, regarding the activities of the Russian Federation in the context of the operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine.



The stated goals of the biological program of the USA

(Заявленные цели биологических программ США)

Monitoring of the biological situation

Мониторинг биологической обстановки

Assistance to developing countries

Оказание помощи развивающимся странам

Development of means and methods of biological protection

Разработка средств и методов биологической защиты

«1. Строительство военных лабораторий вокруг границ геополитических противников
2. Сбор штаммов особо опасных микроорганизмов, эндемичных для определенных территорий
3. Участие военного ведомства в финансировании научно-исследовательских проектов
6. Испытания на людях токсичных препаратов»

Signs of the USA conducting research bypassing the obligations under the BTWC (Признаки проведения США исследований в обход требований КБТО)

INDIRECT (КОСВЕННЫЕ)

1. Construction of military laboratories around the borders of geopolitical opponents

2. Collection of strains of particularly dangerous microorganisms endemic to certain territories

3. Increasing the number of works on the artificial creation of dangerous microorganisms with specified properties

4. Participation of the military department in the financing of research projects

5. Increased funding of biological programs (including in the field of synthetic biology, paleogenomics, etc.)

6. Human testing of toxic drugs

7. Collection of biological material of "mono-ethnoses"

DIRECT (IN VIOLATION OF THE BTWC) (ПРЯМЫЕ (в нарушение КБТО))

Violation of article IV of the BTWC

Failure to take the necessary measures at the national level to prohibit and prevent the development, production, accumulation, acquisition or preservation of biological weapons

Conclusion of agreements allowing the work to be carried out in violation of Article I of the BTWC

Preservation of measures in national legislation that allow the development of biological weapons


Patenting of technical means of delivery and use of biological weapons

Непринятие на национальном уровне необходимых мер по запрещению и предотвращению разработки, производства, накопления, приобретения или сохранения биологического оружия

Заключение соглашений, допускающих проведение работ в нарушение I статьи КБТО

Сохранение в национальном законодательстве мер, позволяющих осуществлять разработку биологического оружия

Патентование технических средств доставки и применения биологического оружия



Proposals to strengthen the BTWC

Resumption of negotiations on a legally binding protocol to the Convention, which would include lists of microorganisms, toxins and equipment (by analogy with the control lists of the CWC), would be comprehensive and have an effective verification mechanism

The establishment of a scientific advisory committee with equal geographical representation and the rights of participants, in compliance with the so-called "ten principle", according to which the decision should be made taking into account an alternative point of view, even if it is expressed by only one State

Expansion of confidence-building measures, with the mandatory declaration by States of their activities in the biological sphere outside the national territory

Расширение мер укрепления доверия, с обязательным объявлением государствами своей деятельности в биологической сфере за пределами национальной территории

Список токсичных химикатов и прекурсоров, в соответствии с КЗХО

ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

OPCW

8. SUBSTITUTES OF CHEMISTS

The following Schedule lists toxic chemicals and their precursors. For the purpose of sub-paragraph 1(a) of the Convention, toxic chemicals are chemical elements in the main category of toxic chemical elements according to the provisions of the Verification Annex, Part one, as Annex C, paragraph 1, and, toxic chemicals do not constitute a definition of chemical weapons.

(Whereas elements are listed by means of chemical symbols, elements are a part of any mixture in particular, of chemical products, in all possible combinations of mixtures, except listed as substances are chemical as listed in the respective Schedule, as long as they are not listed as chemical. A chemical element "as" in Schedule 1, part A, is subject to special controls for destruction and control, as specified in Part 1(a) of the Verification Annex.)

Schedule 1	(CAS number)
A. Toxic elements	
(1) A. Arsenic	
(a) Arsenic trioxide and arsenic pentoxide (b) Arsenic trihydride	
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(2) Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(3) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(4) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(5) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(6) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(7) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(8) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(9) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(10) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(11) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(12) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(13) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(14) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(15) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(16) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(17) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(18) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(19) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(20) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(21) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(22) A. Arsenic trioxide	
(a) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
(b) Arsenic trihydride	(1314-46-4)
(c) Arsenic trioxide	(1314-46-4)
e.g. Arsenic trioxide	(1